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SELECT ASPECTS OF THE WISCONSIN
EMPLOYMENT PEACE ACT*
JUSTIN C. SMITH**
The sponsors1 of the Wisconsin Employment Peace ActV viewed
their efforts as "something more than the establishment of a penal
code," that is, a mere deterrent 3 to industrial strife. This article will
treat those provisions of the act which do not speak to recognition of
bargaining agent, 4 the "all union shop,"5 or unfair labor practices,6 per
se. Examination will be made of three more or less unrelated sections
of Chapter 111 of the Wisconsin Statutes in an effort to contrast the
stated purpose of the act with what it has accomplished in practice.
Unlike the previous article,7 documentation for the author's conclusions
must rest heavily on the results of his two-year field study of the act8
and less upon administrative decisions.
In their order of consideration, the sections are: (I) Declaration of
Policy; (II) Mediation; (III) Arbitration; (IV) Prevention of Unfair
Labor Practices; (V) Enforcement under the Act; (VI) Conclusions.
I. POLICY
The wording of the Peace Act is such that little latitude is left to
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board to determine policy. An
appraisal of the act would seem to indicate that the legislature reserved
to itself the making of policy by precise definitions and by detailed spell-
ing out of the procedure to be followed under the act. Subsequent legis-
*This article is Part II of a two-part series. Part I appeared in Volume 45-2 of
the Marquette Law Review.
**Professor of Law, Western Reserve University.
1 See Smith, Background and Events Leading tip to the Passage of the Wiscon-
sin Employment Peace Act, 12 LAB. L. J. 23 (1961).2 WIs. STAT. ch. 111 (1959).
3 Statement by Milo K. Swenton, Executive Secretary of the Wisconsin Council
of Agriculture, for the author, in the 1957 file in the Western Reserve Law
Library.4 WlS. STAT. §§111.06(1) (a),(b),(c)(1) (1959) and Wis. STAT. §111.06(2) (a)
(1959).
5 Wis. STAT. §111.06(1) (c) (2) (1959).
6 WS. STAT. §111.06 (1),(2),(3) (1959).
7 Smith, Unfair Labor Practices in Wisconsin, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 223 (1961).8 This article is a by-product of a two-year field study evaluating the impact that
the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act has had on Wisconsin labor-management
relations. The study centered around a series of confrontations with practi-
tioners, judges, and spokesmen for labor and management. In order to achieve
uniformity of response a pre-tested questionnaire was employed during the
course of the eighty formal interviews which the author held. A copy of this
questionnaire is appended to this article. Of those interviewed, four men were
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices, two were Circuit Court Judges, and ap-
proximately one-half were attorneys. Selection of those to be interviewed was
influenced by a desire to determine the impact of the act throughout the state.
Parenthetically, the author wishes to note that of the groups contacted attor-
neys for the most part proved to be the best informed.
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latures have not seen fit to modify the basic provisions of the Peace Act
as enacted in 1939. The reason for this policy is undoubtedly attribut-
able to the 'fact that the Peace Act was the product of forces aligned
with the Republican Party, which has remained in power since the pas-
sage of the legislation.9
The reason for the dearth of administrative decisions interpreting
and expanding the act may also lie in the fact that under the statute the
Board has neither the power to investigate unfair labor practices nor
discretion to hear charges of such practices.
An apprisal of the administration of the Peace Act over the past
twenty-two years indicates that the Board has followed closely the
statutory direction set forth in Section 111.01, the Declaration of Pol-
icy.10 This section emphasizes four points, the first being that the public
has an interest in labor-management relations. Although the Board has
not made a clearly formulated statement of this principle, there is con-
siderable evidence from an examination of its case by case approach that
a recognition of the public's interest in labor disputes has guided it in
reaching decisions.
When specifically questioned as to what the Board recognizes to be
the public's interest in a labor dispute, a representative of the Board
has suggested that, "The public may well have an interest in the erection
of a public school building, the construction of which has been tempor-
arily halted by picketing." Similarly a Board member suggested that,
"The public has an interest in a strike situation in which violence has
been introduced."
A second policy consideration enumerated in Section 111.01 is that:
[Certain] employers, including farmers and farm co-operatives,
in addition to their general employer problems, face special prob-
lems arising from perishable commodities and seasonal produc-
tion which require adequate consideration.
Here again, although there is no announced Board policy, the Board's
position can be synthesized from situations in which it has acted. From
a review of the Board decisions in this area and conversations with
Board members and parties involved, it is learned that the Board has not
given special consideration to this group of employers. In defense of
the Board's position it should be stated that the act itself, although call-
ing attention to the problems of this group, does not afford the Board
any special power with which to act. Although the act does provide that
unions representing employees working in this industry give the Board
notice of intention to strike,"" the Board is powerless to give special
treatment to disputes arising out of the production and processing of
9 Smith, supra note 1.10 Supra note 2.
3. Wis. STAT. §111.11 (2) (1959).
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farm commodities. It may be fairly stated that the Board has been most
diligent in its mediation activities among this class of employers.
A third statutory direction with respect to the formulation of policy
may be found in the encouragement which Section 111.01 gives to col-
lective bargaining. Here for the first time it is seen that the Board is
given some latitude in the implementation of policy. Through an active
mediation service and willingness to arbitrate matters, the Board has
attempted to foster the collective bargaining process. Spokesmen for
both labor and management have acknowledged with favor the Board's
activities in this area.
The concluding point raised by Section 111.01 deals with the ex-
peditious and impartial adjudication of the rights and obligations of
parties to a labor dispute. Here again the act leaves little latitude to the
Board in the adjudication of these disputes. In reviewing Board proce-
dure, one sees but a single area in which the Board has followed this
directive, that being in the handling of discharge cases. Here the Board
has made it known that it will expedite the dispositicn of such cases in
order that an improperly discharged employee will be returned to work
as soon as possible, thereby restoring his regular income and at the
same time reducing the employer's obligation in making him whole.
It is evident from the language of the act and from the statements
of those associated with the act's passage'12 that the Peace Act was in-
tentionally drafted to minimize the opportunity of the Board to exercise
policy judgments. The reason for this position is to be found in the
belief of those responsible for the legislation that the administrative
discretion exercised by the Board's predecessor (WLRB) "exceeded
the needs of the times." In the years since 1939, neither organized labor
nor management has sought to materially add to the Board's discretion
in the disposition of labor disputes. This lack of interest probably stems
from a reluctance to leave the matter up to a body whose composition,
and therefore disposition, is subject to change. 13
SUMMARY
As noted before, the WEPA was drafted as a comprehensive labor
code, that is, a self-contained body of law enacted for the purpose of
insuring a degree of stability in labor-management relations. The word-
ing of the declaration of policy contained in Section 111.01 itself bears
a second reading.'4 Thus the declaration of policy represents the desires
of widely diversified interests which are partially incompatible. The act
attempts to set up a workable compromise between these claims.
In addition to creating certain new rights, the act seeks to affirm
12 Smith, supra note 1.
23 It should be noted, however, that the composition of the Board has remained
relatively unchanged over the years. The most recent addition to the Board is
Mr. Arvid Anderson, who was recently appointed to a six-year term.
14 Supra note 2.
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other rights which both labor and management presume to have existed
prior to the passage of the act. Here the statute immediately encountered
difficulties. First, both labor and management are of the opinion that
they have certain basic rights which are not dependent upon statutory
recognition for survival. An example of these rights is management's
assertion, "We have the right to manage our business as we see fit."
Labor, on the other hand, counters, "We have a right to see that union
standards are not undermined." Neither of these rights is mentioned
anywhere in the statute, with the result that the Board has no statutory
direction to recognize these propositions.
A second problem which the statute encounters turns on those rights
of labor which the statute recognizes but which it restricts for the public
interest. For example, the statute encourages organization and collective
bargaining but limits the right of organized labor to use certain organi-
zational techniques-those dangerous to the public, productive of vio-
lence, or beyond the scope of fair conduct.
Still a third problem, and one more difficult to evaluate, is posed by
the statute's partial failure to recognize certain rights which are neces-
sary for the survival of organized labor in specific industries. Most con-
troversial is the failure of the statute to provide for adequate union
security measures in the building trades, where, due to employee rota-
tion and the industry's seasonal nature, it is impossible for organized
labor to petition for authorization for the all-union shop.
At the time the act was passed, the means chosen to effectuate the
policies of the statute were presumed to be sufficient. However, in draft-
ing the statute there appears to have been some confusion between the
ends sought and the means chosen. One sees this in the act's limitations
on labor's organizational activities, while at the same time the act seeks
to strengthen unionism through certain limitations on employers' con-
duct.
The act lays great stress on the collective bargaining process as a
means by which labor-management relations may be advanced. Thus it
envisions the adjustment of differences between labor and management
over the bargaining table. However, the Peace Act does not come to
grips with the situation where one of the parties may possess an upper
hand and is unwilling to voluntarily modify its position.
II. MEDIATION
A. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 111.11(1)
As one might expect, the act establishes certain responsibilities in the
Board for mediation. Section 111.11 (1) provides:
The board shall have the power to appoint any competent,
impartial, disinterested person to act as mediator in any labor dis-
pute either upon its own initiative or upon request of one of the
parties to the dispute ... but neither the mediator nor the board
1961-621
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shall have any power of compulsion in mediation proceedings.
The board shall provide necessary expenses for such mediators as
it may appoint . . . and prescribe reasonable rules of procedure
for such mediators.
Through the intermittent use of outside parties, it was hoped that
the Board would have men available to it with specialized knowledge of
particular areas, who, because of vocational commitments, could serve
only on an ad hoc basis. However, in practice the anticipation of the
act's sponsors has not been realized, and for the most part those men
selected by the Board for service in this area have not been acceptable
to the parties. Therefore state mediation has been carried on almost ex-
clusively by the executive secretary.
The fact that the statute does not limit the Board's responsibilities
in this area to matters in which the public has demonstrated an interest
is indicative of the fact that the parties responsible for the act's passage
felt that "public mediation" should not be limited to a particular class
of labor disputes.15
B. DUTIES OF A STATE MEDIATOR
The statute directs that the mediator shall bring the parties together
voluntarily under such circumstances as will reduce conflict and will
effect an orderly settlement of the dispute. Although the act does not
direct the mediator to intervene as a conciliator, fact-finder, or arbitrator,
it does imply that the mediator shall put in something more than just
an appearance. Further, the act does not attempt to preclude the selec-
tion by the parties of a private mediator. Congress, in passing the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, established the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service for the purpose of minimizing industrial dis-
putes in interstate commerce and charged that agency with duties rough-
ly parallel to those of the Board under Section 111.11.
Section 203(b) of the L.R.M.A. provides:
The Service may proffer its services in any labor dispute in
any industry affecting commerce, either upon its own motion or
upon the request of one or more of the parties to the dispute,
whenever in its judgment such dispute threatens to cause a sub-
stantial interruption to commerce. . . . The Director and the
Service are directed to avoid attempting to mediate disputes
which would have only a minor effect on interstate commerce
if state or other conciliation services are available to the parties.
[Emphasis added.] 16
While the suggestion has been made by a number of disinterested parties
that the "federal service has been overly aggressive in assuming juris-
diction over disputes in their states," there is no evidence that such has
15 See discussion of public interest under "I. Policy."




been the case in Wisconsin. In view of the amiable relationship which
has existed between the "federal service" and the Board, there is no need
to comment further on the subject other than to note that the majority
of disputes involving interstate commerce are handled by the "federal
service." This fact in turn means that a large share of the Board's medi-
ation work-load comes from outside the metropolitan Milwaukee area.
C. SELECT ASPECTS OF THE WERB's MEDIATION ACTIVITIES
In the past, the majority of the Board's mediation activities were
handled by its executive secretary with support from a commissioner
when the Board's work-load demanded the services of more than one
individual. The expressed preference of the Board for its mediation
activities to be handled by the executive secretary stemmed from the
belief that (1) the parties might have had greater confidence in some-
one known to them and in one who continues to work in this field, and
(2) there was danger in having this function handled by an individual,
viz., the commissioner, who on a subsequent occasion might have been
called upon to pass on charges growing out of an agreement which he
assisted in negotiating.
Although early in its history the Board instituted a panel of medi-
ators upon whom the parties to a dispute might draw, and has kept this
panel current through additions and deletions. Interviews of both labor
and management indicate that they "prefer the services of the Board or
not at all." It therefore appears that the popularity of the executive
secretary's mediation efforts stems not from the fact that they are of-
fered without charge but that both labor and management desire his
services.
The statutory authority of the Board to act in a given dispute is
severely limited by the proviso, "but neither the mediator nor the Board
shall have any power of compulsion in mediation proceedings." Further,
neither the mediator nor the Board possesses under this subsection
either the power of subpoena or the authorization to engage in "fact-
finding activities." Many states, including the neighboring state of
Michigan, have statutes providing the state's mediation service with the
power to subpoena witnesses. Other states provide for the establishment
of a fact-finding board if the parties are unable to make progress toward
the settlement of a dispute. Surprising as it may seem, the absence of
such powers does not appear to have materially handicapped the Board
in carrying out the directives of Section 111.11. A review of the record
of the Board's activities in this area indicates that since its inception the
Board has avoided "using the press as a lever for the purpose of getting
the parties to move." Similarly, "there is no evidence that the Board has
ever resorted to using the governor's office to settle a dispute."
Apart from the agricultural-strike-notice proviso in Section 111.11
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(2), the statute is silent as to when the Board shall intervene in a dis-
pute. Past Board intervention in a given dispute was largely determined
by the facts present at the time. In many instances, the initial request
from one of the parties for mediation services is made in the form of
a telephone call to the Board. Upon receipt of such a call, the executive
secretary will, if both parties are not in agreement as to a date, attempt
to set a date that will be agreeable. If, during the course of the first
meeting, there is an indication that progress can be made, the mediator
will schedule a subsequent meeting. On the other hand, if the mediator
finds that his further participation would be premature or that the parties
are not really in need of his services, he may choose to withdraw tem-
porarily from the case. There is every indication that in its over-all
approach the Board does not "attempt to negotiate the parties' agree-
ment nor to intercede, should the parties encounter a temporary ob-
stacle in the path of reaching an agreement."
The Board has not attempted to undertake what has been called
"preventive mediation," that is, mediation designed to eliminate bottle-
necks in collective bargaining. Although it is difficult to generalize as to
just what constitutes preventive mediation, it may be summed up by
stating that it presupposes something of a continuing relationship be-
tween the state's mediation effort and labor and management through-
out the state. In view of the current demands on the Board's time, it
would appear that such activities are not possible at the present time.
The actual timing used by the Board is difficult to state. As indi-
cated above, the appearance of the mediator may be determined by other
demands being made on his time. Typically the state mediator will
spend a day or two in the community, working with the parties, and if
the impass6 is not surmounted at that time, he will frequently re-
schedule a meeting within a week or two. "This lapse of time between
meetings affords the parties time to rethink their positions and again
places on them the burden of negotiating a mutually acceptable agree-
ment." For the most part this procedure appears to be acceptable to the
parties. A number of those interviewed indicated that from their ex-
perience the Board has displayed a marked degree of sophistication in
intermittently assisting the parties in their attempt to reach an agree-
ment.
D. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE MEDIATOR FOR THE SIGNED
AGREEMENT
Just as the statute is silent as to the timing of the mediator's appear-
ance, it is likewise silent as to the responsibility of the mediator for the
finished product of his efforts. It may be argued in theory that the
declaration of policy set forth in Section 111.01 implies a higher stand-
ard of professional responsibility on the part of the state mediator than
[Vol. 45
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can be expected of a private mediator who is retained only to satisfy
the interests of the parties. Certainly it can be advanced that the pres-
ence of a representative of the state demands that, insofar as the medi-
ator can ascertain, the signed agreement be not illusory to either of the
parties and that it will contribute to industrial peace.
The question of the moral responsibility with which a state mediator
may be charged is not easily evaluated, particularly under a statute such
as the Peace Act. Section 111.11 does not imply that the function of the
state mediator is such that he is responsible for writing an "insurance
contract" for the parties. The general consensus of those interviewed
was that the duty to define is on the parties and not on the state mediator.
Counsel for labor and management are most emphatic on this point.
Further, one attorney interviewed went on to state the "arts of trim-
ming" the agreement are for counsel for the respective parties and not
for a representative of the Board. Another attorney indicated that when
it comes to "feathering the bird, I want to do it myself without any help
from an outsider."
E. SUBSEQUENT INTERVENTION BY THE MEDIATOR
Two problems remain to be discussed. First, what is the responsibil-
ity of the mediator under the act for subsequent interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement which he has assisted in negotiating?
Second, what are the implications arising out of the repeated use of the
Board's mediation service?
In answer to the first question, under Section 111.10 the parties are
free to call upon the Board to act or name arbitrators to hear any dis-
pute arising out of an agreement. However, the Board is seldom called
upon to aid in the construction of an agreement formally or informally,
with the consequence that the parties seldom ask the Board's mediator
to construe an agreement "upon which he has worked."
With respect to the second problem, that of the repetitious use of the
mediator, a more difficult question is raised. Repeated use of the Board's
mediation service certainly represents a potential danger spot. In com-
menting on this situation, a representative of the Board has stated:
While repetitive requests are flattering to the mediator and
to the mediation service it has the danger, in my view, of lessen-
ing the incentive and the ability of the parties to settle their own
disputes. Such an increasing role in mediation lends itself to po-
litical problems whereby labor and management may become
more interested in influencing the selection of mediators than in
preparing themselves for the collective bargaining responsibili-
ties.1
7
This observation has been discussed with a number of individuals
17A statement by Arvid Anderson, Commissioner, W.E.R.B., at the Association
of State MediationAgencies, 6th Annual Conference, July 16-18, 1957, reported
in 80 LAB. L.J. 608 (1957).
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conversant with the Board's mediation activities, and all are in agree-
ment that such a possibility exists. However, since the ultimate success
of any mediation effort is dependent upon the acceptance of the medi-
ator by both parties, it is doubtful that any mediator associated with the
interests of either side in a dispute would enjoy material success in ex-
ecuting his office.
F. ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES TO THE BOARD'S MEDIATION EFFORT
During the course of the field study the following question was
asked:
"What do you think of the Board's mediation function (Section
111.11)?"
The majority of those interviewed indicated that they felt this was
one of the more positive aspects of the act. A representative comment
was, "very effective outside of Milwaukee County-particularly in
Northern Wisconsin." When questioned as to whether or not there is
some real danger in having the state's mediation service be a part of
W.E.R.B., the majority expressed the belief that this is not a real prob-
lem. The answer undoubtedly is to be found in the fact that the func-
tions are mutually exclusive to a certain extent and, therefore, do not
conflict with each other. It is only in the exceptional situation that the
Board is called upon both to mediate a dispute and subsequently to hear
unfair labor practice charges arising out of the same situation.
A number of observers have raised the question of labor's willing-
ness to use the Board's offices for mediation in view of labor's outspoken
criticism of the act. The answer apparently lies in the fact that the
Peace Act is by no means new legislation, and as a result many of
labor's initial misgivings about the act in its entirety have "shaken
down" to acceptance or rejection of certain aspects of the act. Further,
regardless of labor's stated attitude toward the act, the average local
cannot long resist the temptation to use any segment of the act which
will advance its position.
This is not to say that all of the individuals interviewed indicated
complete acceptance of either mediation or the Board's activities in this
area. Although several attorneys for management expressed the belief
that labor often seeks to use the mediation provisions of the Peace Act
prematurely, there was no indication that attorneys for either labor or
management felt that such use proved to be detrimental in achieving an
agreement.
G. THE STRIKE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 111.11(2)
As a result of agriculture's experience in attempting to market its
perishable farm commodities in the labor unrest of the late 1930's,18
there was incorporated into Section 111.11 the following provision:
Is Smith, supra note 1.
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Where the exercise of the right to strike by employees of any
employer engaged in the state of Wisconsin in the production,
harvesting or initial processing (the latter after leaving the farm)
of any farm or dairy product produced in this state would tend
to cause the destruction of such product, the employees shall
give to the board at least 10 days' notice of their intention to
strike and the board shall immediately notify the employer of
receipt of such notice. Upon receipt of such notice, the board
shall take immediate steps to effect mediation .... In the event
of the failure of the efforts to mediate, the board shall endeavor
to induce the parties to arbitrate the controversy.
Oddly enough, the strike notice provision of the act proved to be
one of the more controversial aspects covered by the field interviews.
The question as framed on the interview sheet asked:
What is your feeling as to the desirability of the strike notice
provision of the Act, covering the production, harvesting or in-
itial processing of any dairy or farm products?
A representative sampling of the answers ranged from: "An essen-
tial provision," to, "It is not effective; you give notice and then call a
strike when you please."
Despite this diversity of opinion, there is evidence that this provision
has little effect on labor-management relations in the state's agricultural
areas. In practice, unions tend to file their notice of an intention to
strike at the beginning of negotiations with the covered industries. As
one union spokesman put it, "Only the inexperienced get caught by not
filing their strike notice." Further, there is evidence that in so doing
unions tend to frighten the owners of small upstate co-operative cream-
eries, with the result that the owners feel that a strike is impending un-
less an agreement is hastily reached. This fact is verified by a spokesman
for the state's dairy interests.
The significance of Section 111.11 (2) lies in the fact that it is widely
commented upon by labor. Labor typically refers to it as "an example
of act's one-sidedness and the preferential treatment the act confers on
the state's farm interests."
Notwithstanding the record of this provision, many still look upon
a strike notice provision as a panacea for all labor difficulties. However,
after fully assessing its effect in practice, the author is of the opinion
that the continuing value of this provision may be seriously questioned.
Several spokesmen for the state's agricultural interests have informally
expressed a similar belief in spite of the official position of agriculture.
SUMMARY
The over-all effect of Section 111.11(1) has been to afford to the
parties, without charge, uniformly good mediation services when needed.
This service does not purport to negotiate the parties' agreement for
them, nor does it insure that the public interest will be advanced in all
1961-62]
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instances through the process of collective bargaining. It offers a unique
vehicle, as does all mediation work, for certain "missionary" work
whereby the parties may be apprised of the advantages of true collective
bargaining.
As indicated above, the strike notice provision of the act-Section
111.11 (2)-is at best less than a success.
Although there is no formula by which respective provisions of the
act can be measured, it is apparent from the results of this study that
the mediation provisions of Section 111.11 have had only slightly less
impact on labor-management relations than the unfair labor practice
provisions.
III. ARBITRATION
A. THE BOARD'S RESPONSBILITIES
Section 111.10 of the Peace Act sets forth the Board's duties with
respect to the arbitration of disputes. That section provides:
Parties to a labor dispute may agree in writing to have the board
act or name arbitrators in all or any part of such dispute, and
thereupon the board shall have the power as to act.
Although the section goes on to provide that the Board shall appoint as
arbitrators only competent, disinterested parties and that the proceed-
ings shall be as provided for in Chapter 298,1' the statute affords the
Board little other guidance in the performance of its office in this respect.
B. LANGUAGE OF WLRA SECTION 111.12(1)
In discussions of this section of the act with various persons re-
sponsible for the act's passage, it has become apparent that the brevity
of this section was due to the fact that agriculture during the thirties
was far from enthusiastic about labor arbitration. This fact undoubtedly
explains why the Peace Act differs materially from its predecessor, the
WLRA. Further, an analysis of the WLRA indicates that the difference
is more than superficial. This may be seen from the fact that Section
111.12 of the WLRA 0 provided:
(1) The board shall have the power to act and to appoint any
person, agent or agency to act as arbitrator in labor disputes,
when parties agree to submit the whole or any part of the labor
dispute to the arbitrator of the board or its appointees. A pro-
vision in a written agreement to submit to the arbitration of the
board or its appointees, when accepted by the board after the
dispute has arisen, shall be valid and irrevocable as to the parties
to the agreement, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. [Emphasis added.]
This section also provided:
If any party fails to perform under such contract or submission.
the board or its appointees may nevertheless in the direction of
19 WIS. STAT. ch. 298 (1953).
20 Wis. LAWS 1937, ch. 51, Wis. STAT. §111.12(1) (1937).
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the board proceed to hear the case ex parte, and the board or its
appointees shall have the power to issue an award applicable to
the submitting parties. 21
In contrast to this, Section 111.10 of the Peace Act incorporates by
reference the procedural aspect of the state's general arbitration statute,
Chapter 298, which provides, in part:
A provision in any written contract to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract, or out of a re-
fusal to perform in whole or in part thereof . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract .... 22
C. LImiTFD JURISDICTION OF BOARD
Thus the Peace Act, unlike its predecessor, does not guarantee that
once the board has assumed jurisdiction over the matter, its jurisdiction
continues until relinquished.
Hence, in practice a third party, not a party to the dispute, may
exert pressure against one or both of the parties to the end that the
matter may be withdrawn from arbitration.
A further difference is to be found in the two pieces of legislation.
Under the Peace Act, Section 111.07(7), the parties are required to seek
judicial relief or to file an unfair labor practice charge in the event of
failure on the part of the other party to accept the award, while under
the WLRA, Section 111.12, the following enforcement proceeding was
provided for:
(3) When an award has been made by the board or in its name,
the board shall file the award in the office of the clerk of the cir-
cuit court of Dane County.... Unless a petition to impeach the
award .. . shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit
court of Dane County, the court shall enter judgment in accord-
ance with the terms of the award, provided that no employees
collectively, shall be compelled to render labor or services with-
out their consent. 23
As can readily be seen, this subsection avoided the necessity of (1) the
parties having to go into court to get an order enforcing an award, or
(2) the Board having to take any steps to enforce its award.
Further restriction on impeaching an award under the WLRA in-
cluded the requirement that the party initiating the impeachment pro-
ceedings do so within ten days after receiving notice of the award, and
the requirement that the courts could sustain such a petition only on the
following grounds:
(a) That the proceeding was not substantially in conformity with
the provisions of the arbitration agreement or rules adopted for
the conduct of the arbitration.
21 Ibid.
22 WIs. STAT. §298.01 (1959).
23 Wis. LAWS 1937, ch. 51, Wis. STAT. §111.12(3) (1937).
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(b) That the arbitrator or member of the board participating in
the award was guilty of fraud or corruption; or that a party to
the award practiced fraud or corruption which affected the re-
sults.... [Emphasis added.] 24
The WLRA, in contrast to the Peace Act, further provided that the
court should not set aside an award for uncertainty but should suspend
action, pending the award's resubmission to the Board for further ac-
tion. By the same token, the reviewing court was not to set aside an
award for mathematical or verbal mistakes, but rather should correct
the award and treat it as having been filed correctly. The WLRA also
provided that:
Where a petition for the impeachment of an award is granted,
the award shall be vacated, and the court may in its discretion
order the board to re-arbitrate the case in accordance with the
terms of the original agreement unless the submitting parties
agree upon some other course.
D. EXPERIENCE UNDER SECTION 111.12
During its short existence, from April 1937 to May 1939, the Wis-
consin Labor Relations Board received sixty-three arbitration matters.
2 5
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board on a year-to-year basis has
received the following number of cases :26
1939 8 1950 27
1940 7 1951 22
1941 9 1952 20
1942 6 1953 25
1943 3 1954 20
1944 4 1955 27
1945 5 1956 28
1946 6 1957 45
1947 7 1958 33
1948 17 1959 66
1949 15
The marked upswing in cases heard by the Board in the last twelve
years is significant in showing the parties' acceptance of the board's
activities in this area.
The total number of employees involved in the disposition of an
arbitration case is of limited significance, since a case involving a single
employee may demand as much of the Board's time as one involving a
hundred employees. This observation is substantiated in part by the fact
that during the fiscal year 1954, the Board listed 512 employees as af-
fected by arbitration matters closed by it during that period. During the
fiscal year 1955 it listed only 71 employees so affected.
24 Ibid.
25 Wis. LRB CONCLUDING REP. (1939), on file with the State Historical Society,
Madison, Wisconsin.
26 Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Annual Reports; the most recent is
22 Wis. ERB. ANN. REP. (1961).
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A detailed examination of these statistics, coupled with observations
made in the field, indicates that for the most part the Board's arbitration
activities center around small locals and employers who find it feasible
to use the Board rather than employ a private arbitrator.
E. USE OF OUTSIDE ARBITRATOR
The Board on the whole has been reluctant to appoint outside ar-
bitrators to handle the limited number of disputes which come before it.
In only five instances during the 1957-58 period and in only five during
the 1958-59 period did the Board close arbitration cases by the appoint-
ment of an arbitrator who was neither a Board member nor a member
of the staff of the WERB. In the 1959-60 period nine outside appoint-
ments were utilized in disposing of arbitration matters by the Board.
SUMMARY
While some question may be raised with respect to the desirability
of state supported arbitration, there is every indication that this pro-
vision of the act has advanced labor-management relations in the state.
By affording "free service" to the parties, particularly in disputes in-
volving small employers and locals, the Board has an unprecedented
opportunity to educate the parties to the value of aritration. In many
instances the need for arbitration has proved to be greatest among small
employers and locals, where the degree of sophistication in labor mat-
ters is less than generally expected.
To this end the provisions of Section 111.10 may be regarded as a
success and in keeping with the announced policy of the Peace Act.
IV. PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Attention is next called to that section of the act which seeks to pre-
vent the commission or continuation of unfair labor practices.2 7 It should
be noted that the act, by establishing statutory standards of conduct and
by limiting the Board's investigative function, effectively precludes the
recognition of new types of unfair labor practices.
A. WHO MAY FILE
Section 111.07 of the Peace Act directs that any controversy arising
out of an unfair labor practice may be submitted to the Board "in the
manner and with the effect provided in this subchapter." However, the
act goes on to provide that nothing in the act shall deprive the parties
of their right to pursue either legal or equitable relief from such act in
a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus the Board is powerless to act until an alleged wrong is formally
called to its attention, that is, a complaint must be filed with the Board.
Under the administrative rules and regulations promulgated by the
Board, the following procedure is provided:
2 7
WIs. STAT. §111.07 (1959).
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ERB 2.01. A complaint that a person has engaged or is engag-
ing in an unfair labor practice may be submitted by any party in
interest. Such complaint shall be in writing upon a form pro-
vided by the Board, the original being signed and sworn to....
Five additional copies of the complaint shall be filed.2 8
In practice, however, the Board has accepted both oral complaints
and complaints regular in form but not filed in a form provided by the
Board. Complaints are generally preceded by a telephone conversation
with a representative of the Board, wherein the complaining party ex-
plains the "situation" and requests advice regarding his rights. It has
been the practice of the Board not to advise complainants of their "legal
rights" under the act. Rather the Board will advise the party of the action
taken on similar complaints filed in the past. By conducting itself in this
manner the Board has avoided any criticism of pre-judging a complaint.
If a complainant has filed a defective complaint, the Board will return
it with the necessary forms and a recommendation that the party refile.
In keeping with its responsibilities relative to the prevention of unfair
labor practices, the Board has taken the position that it will look to
substance rather than form.
B. WHAT MUST BE CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT
Other requirements set forth in the Board's administrative rules
and regulations are that the complaint shall contain:
(a) The full name and address of the person making the com-
plaint....
(b) The full name and address of the person against whom the
complaint is made....
(c) A clear and concise statement of the facts constituting the
alleged unfair labor practice or practices .... 2
Thus it is necessary that the party or parties filing a complaint have
some idea of the person or type of organization responsible for the un-
fair labor practice (in practice such information may be extremely diffi-
cult to obtain) plus such facts as are necessary to establish the visita-
tions of an unfair labor practice or the impending visitation of such a
practice. The initial burden is on the complaining party to make a sub-
stantial showing of a violation of the statute. Since the Board does not
possess any investigative powers, the statutory requirement would ap-
pear to be that the showing be such that a Board member could find upon
reading the complaint that there is a strong likelihood that an unfair
labor practice has been or is about to be committed. In practice the Board
has not attempted to pass on whether the facts, as alleged in the com-
plaint, are such that there is a strong possibility that the party charged
may be found guilty of an unfair labor practice.
2SWis. ADM. CODE, E.R.B. §2.01 (1961).
29 Wis. ADM. CODE, E.R.B. §2.02 (1961).
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When polled specifically as to what percentage of the complaints are
rejected by the Board prior to a hearing or during the course of a hear-
ing, a commissioner indicated recently that to his knowledge very few
complaints had been rejected prior to hearing during the course of the
last eight years, and that to the best of his knowledge only a limited num-
ber had been rejected during the course of the hearing during the same
period.
It appears, therefore, that the Board in following the statutory di-
rection for the prevention of unfair labor practices has adopted the
broadest possible interpretation of a cause of action under the statute.
Notwithstanding this position, the Board early in its existence let it be
known that it would not lend its offices to "fishing expeditions" or to
the harassment of parties to a labor dispute.
C. RATIONALE BEHIND SECTION 111.07
Organized labor, during the course of the hearings on Bill 154,A.
(subsequently to be passed as the WEPA), was quick to sense the in-
herent dangers in a statutory scheme which (1) provided little or no
restriction on the filing of unfair labor practice charges, and (2) did
not provide the Board with investigative powers. Thus at the hearing
on the bill before the Joint Finance Committee on April 12, 1939, or-
ganized labor suggested that the Board should be given investigative
powers as a means of reducing the number of matters litigated before
the Board. The draftsman of the bill, speaking for the Agricultural
Council replied:
We sharply challenge the wisdom of the suggestion. Such a func-
tion destroys the judicial character of the Board.
It is bound to formulate opinions as a result of the investiga-
tion which will incapacitate it from fairly trying the issues upon
hearing. The judicial functions of the board are of primary im-
portance and must be preserved unimpaired. Furthermore, it is
believed that complainants will be more careful to present only
real grievances to the board, if they know that they must face a
trial upon them than if the law permits them to present situ-
ations to the board for investigation which they either know to
be without merit or which are based only upon surmise or sus-
picion.30
During the course of the field interviews spokesmen for organized
labor on numerous occasions expressed the belief that, in practice,
charges of unfair labor practices may be filed too easily.
D. BOARD ORDERED HEARINGS
-Once a complaint is filed and the Board has mailed a copy to all
parties of interest and a hearing has been ordered, the disposition of the
30Memorandum by Walter Bender, Answers to Specific Objections to Bill No.
151A, presented at hearing before Joint Finance Committee on April 12, 1939,




matter before the Board becomes relevant. In commenting on the
method of disposition provided for in the act, the draftsman pointed out:
This section does not require detailed explanation. It prescribes
the practice before the board. This practice is a combination of
the practice now provided by the present law for use before the
Labor Board and that obtained before the Industrial Commis-
sion in workmen's compensation cases. All lawyers are familiar
with the main features of the system thus provided.
It should be noted, however, . .. (b) that it does not follow the
present law in permitting the board to act as investigator, com-
plainant and prosecutor, and then tender the board to the re-
spondent as a fair and impartial judge of the controversy. The
board has judicial functions only in respect to any labor dispute
or other matter pending before it. The practice provided is such
that any party can easily and at small expense have rights or
obligations under this bill determined by it. [Emphasis added.] 31
In regard to the first paragraph of the above quotation, a representa-
tive of the Board, familiar with practice before the WLRB and the
WERB, has indicated that there is very little difference in the appear-
ances which are made today and those which were made in the 1937 to
1938 period.
E. APPEARANCES
In commenting on the second paragraph of the above quotation,
attention is called to the draftsman's concluding sentence wherein he
states that "any party can easily and at small expense have rights or
obligations under the bill determined by it." One of the salient points
developed by the field study was the fact that appearances before the
Board are such that both labor and management may appear without
counsel. For this reason the act has been extremely popular with the
business agents of small locals, who prefer to appear on behalf of a
"brother" (vernacular for fellow union member) rather than calling
in counsel for the international union.
F. ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES
During the course of the field interviews, often over a cup of coffee
with a business agent, the author frequently raised the following ques-
tions:
Do you (Mr. Business Agent) feel the Board's lack of investiga-
tive powers has hampered the Board in the prevention of unfair
labor practices ?
Do you feel that, in lieu of investigative powers, the act's pur-
pose could better be effectuated by having an attorney (general
counsel) associated with the Board for the purpose of assisting
in the filing and the presentation of unfair labor practice charges
before the Board?
31 Walter Bender, Commentary on Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, on file
with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.
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Surprisingly enough, the Board's lack of investigative powers caused
little concern on the part of organized labor. The explanation for this
attitude seems to lie in the fact that union leaders have little, if any,
current difficulty in appearing before the Board. Several indicated that
they "prefer to make their own case free from outside pressure."
In regard to the proposal for the establishment of an office of "gen-
eral counsel" a similar attitude was displayed. For the most part labor
spokesmen indicated that they prefer "things as they currently are"
with freedom to use the Board when they so desire and, conversely,
freedom to be left alone when it serves their purpose.
Representatives of management have been explicit in indicating that
they wish no part in a revision of the act either to afford the Board
investigative powers or for the establishment of an office of "general
counsel." A spokesman for the Wisconsin Council of Agriculture Co-
operatives, the organization responsible for the Peace Act, shared the
same attitude as that of management. This attitude is summed up in
the statement of a vice-president for one of the state's larger manu-
facturers who stated, "parties should fight their own battles and be
willing to pay their own way."
SUMMARY
Two phases of the problem of preventing unfair labor practices
have been treated in this section: (1) the lack of investigative power,
and (2) the disposition of charges as they are called to the Board's at-
tention. It would appear that labor and management are at odds as to
any revision of the act which would afford the Board broad investiga-
tive powers. Others interviewed, aligned with neither labor nor man-
agement, felt that the ability of labor and management to withdraw
behind a cloak of secrecy may lead to questionable practices. That is, a
charging party may at any juncture ask the Board to dismiss an unfair
labor practice charge, and the Board's jurisdiction over the parties
terminates. Oftentimes the party against whom charges are filed is in a
position to exert sufficient pressure on the charging party to make a
settlement attractive. There is always the possibility that these settle-
ments may directly contravene the purpose of the act and jeopardize the
rights of the employees in the bargaining unit. While it would appear
that in the aggregate both labor and management should be afforded
considerable latitude in the settlement of their differences, some urge
that the Board should have discretionary authority to initiate charges
of unfair labor practices and to continue to exercise jurisdiction over
the parties in instances where the complainant seeks a dismissal.
Others have suggested a possible expansion of the Board's authority
to deal with unfair labor practices. It was suggested that Section 111.07
(14)32 be amended to extend the statutory limitation on the right of a
32 Wis. STAT. §11.07(14) (1953).
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party to seek redress from an unfair labor practice from "one year
from the date of the specific act" to one year from the date at which
the party became aware that an act had been committed. In view of the
current complexity in labor relations, particularly in the area of col-
lective bargaining agreements, it would appear desirable to liberalize
the statutory period for the bringing of unfair labor practice charges.
V. ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE ACT
Four sections of the act may logically be grouped together, as they
encompass the enforcement provisions of the act. They are Sections
111.083 3 and 111.09,3- which provide respectively for the presentation
of an annual financial report by unions to their members and for the
promulgation by the Board of certain rules and regulations; section
111.12, 35 which enumerates the role of the Attorney General and district
attorneys in seeking judicial enforcement of Board orders; and section
111.14,36 which provides for sanctions against any individual impeding
or interfering with a member of the Board or officer of the Board.
A. UNION FINANCIAL REPORT TO MEMBERS
Section 111.08 provides that each member of a labor organization
acting as a representative for the purpose of collective bargaining shall
distribute yearly a detailed financial statement of its receipts and dis-
bursements to the members. It is to be noted that only members are
entitled to this statement and that it is to be made available to each
individual member. Should the collective bargaining representative fail
to comply with the requirements of this section, any member of such
organization may petition the Board for an order directing the union
to comply; such order is enforceable in the same manner as any other
Board order. Legislation designed to inform union membership of the
financial standing of their organization is by no means new. The British
Trade Union Act of 187137 had as one of its objectives the providing
of similar information to union membership. This act, commonly re-
ferred to abroad as the "British Trade Union Disclosure Law" was
passed fifteen years before the formation of the American Federation
of Labor in 1886. Thus, statutory precedent for the inclusion of such
a provision in labor legislation is not lacking.
In practice, this particular provision of the act has had little effect
on labor-management relations in Wisconsin. One labor spokesman in-
terviewed expressed the opinion that the presence of this particular re-
quirement in the Peace Act has prevented the passage of more drastic
33 Wis. LAWS 1939, ch. 57, Wis. STAT. §111.08 (1953).
34 WIs. LAWS 1939, ch. 57, Wis. STAT. §111.09 (1953).
35 Wis. LAws 1939, ch. 57, Wis. STAT. §111.12 (1953).
36 Wis. LAWS 1939, ch. 57, Wis. STAT. §111.14 (1953).
37 Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 31, §§1-24, as amended. See CIRUNE,
TRADE UNION LAW (1950).
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disclosure legislation in Wisconsin. 38 Organized labor has not expressed
any dissatisfaction with this particular provision.
B. THE PROMULGATION OF ADMINISTRATIvE RULES AND
REGULATIONS BY THE BOARD
The delegation of certain rule making powers to the Board has not
been the subject of controversy since the passage of the Peace Act.
Prior to the passage of the act, management went on record as stating
that this section was too ambiguous, while labor took the opposite posi-
tion. The act's draftsman, in defending Section 111.09, stated:
As already stated, a bill such as this embodies general principles
and leaves their specific application to the Board and the courts.
But the bill [Section 111.09] does give to the Board broad rule
making powers. Acting under such powers, the Board can and
doubtless will render specific many things which properly are
covered by general language in the bill.
39
In practice, the Board, apart from the promulgation of its "Rules
and Regulations," 40 has not sought through administrative pronounce-
ments to clarify or interpret the act apart from dictum contained in its
decisions.
C. DUTIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
Section 111.12 provides:
Upon the request of the board, the attorney general or the district
attorney of the county in which a proceeding is brought before
the circuit court for the purpose of enforcing or reviewing an
order of the board shall appear and act as counsel for the board
in such a proceeding and any proceeding to review the action of
the circuit court affirming, modifying or reversing such an or-
der.41
By and large, owing to the specialized nature of labor law, the state's
district attorneys have played a minor role in enforcing the Peace Act.
However, this is not to say that judicial review of board orders is the
exception.
4 2
The Attorney General's office, on the other hand, has worked closely
with the Board, both in an advisory capacity and in representing the
Board before the courts. Organized labor has long been at odds with the
Attorney General's office for its activities in enforcing Board orders.
Labor attorneys, during the course of field interviews, repeatedly urged
"greater diligence on the state's part in enforcing back pay awards."
38 For developments on the national scene some twenty years later, see Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
39 Bender, supra note 30.4 0 Wis. A,. CODE E.R.B.
41 Wis. LAWS 1939, ch. 57, Wis. STAT. §111.12 (1953).
4222 Wis. E.R.B. ANN. REP. 55, 2d Annual Rep. Note that in the period from
1939 to 1960, 219 Circuit Court cases reviewing Board orders were disposed of
through trial, settlement, or dismissal.
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Notwithstanding labor's criticism of the Attorney General's office,
it appears that the Board has enjoyed considerable success in seeking
enforcement of its orders before the court as a result of the efforts of
the Attorney General's office.
D. PENALTY
Section 111.14 provides for sanctions against any individual im-
peding or interfering with a member of the Board or officer of the
Board. This particular section which provides for a maximum penalty
in the amount of $500 or imprisonment in the county jail for a year or
both has not been invoked to date. In questioning one Board member
regarding this section, only one example was cited of reluctance on the
part of either labor or management to cooperate.
SUMMARY
The inclusion of the four sections discussed above has had very little
direct effect on labor-management relations in Wisconsin.
VI CONCLUSIONS
Some difficulty is experienced in communicating the attitudes of the
parties interviewed with respect to the act's overall effectiveness and
what importance is to be attached to those sections specifically covered
in this article. In total, approximately 200 individuals conversant with
Section 111 were contacted, of which 80 were formally interviewed.
43
Although no two individuals polled expressed the same opinion on all
phases of the act or its effectiveness, by virtue of the fact that field in-
terviews progressed over a two year period, certain conclusions may be
drawn.
A. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE ACT'S EFFECTIVENESS
In an attempt to evaluate the act's effectiveness, this question was
asked:
Do you think that the Act has helped, retarded, or had no effect
on labor-management relations, bearing in mind the three major
interests mentioned by the Act-(a) the public, (b) the employee
and (c) the employer? 44
In response to this question, management generally felt that the act
contributed materially to labor-management peace by reducing strikes
and strike violence by generally balancing the interests of the parties,
and by engendering a sense of responsibility on the part of labor as well
as management. Labor attorneys and labor leaders were considerably
less enthusiastic and even disagreed among themselves as to whether or
not the act had been beneficial. A number believed that at least part of
the act had in fact retarded labor-management relations, stating that the
all-union shop provision has in some instances forced labor to resort to
violence in order to survive in the economic market. In addition to a
4 See questionnaire appended.
44 Question 2(a), appended.
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question on the general effect of the act, questions were posed as to the
effect of the act on specific individuals. Employers understandably feel
more secure under the present act than under the labor-oriented Wis-
consin Labor Relations Act. Management generally believed that work-
ers, too, felt more secure since they were given speedy relief and ease
of appearance. There was no agreement on the issue among one repre-
sentative of labor. Comments varied from agreement with manage-
ment's position to an out-and-out avowal that, "Employees are less se-
cure in that it is more difficult to prove unfair labor practice charges
under the WEPA than under the national act."
A sub-question sought to determine if the public, individual em-
ployee, and employer had benefited from the act:
How has he (the public, the individual employee and the em-
ployer) benefited?
Management spokesmen uniformly felt that the act had benefited all
three interests, stemming from (1) impartial holdings, (2) uniform
treatment, and (3) no calendar problems. Management also stated that
proceedings under state law were often more advantageous than actions
under the federal act. The reason, these spokesmen believed, sprang
from the more flexible interpretation that the state Board gave to the
WEPA in contrast to interpretations of the Taft-Hartley Act45 by the
NLRB. Management representatives found it beneficial to "have the
fight between defined parties" (arising from the limitations set on or-
ganizational activities by the WEPA) .4 Management was also quick to
point out that "unions may now prosecute their own unfair labor prac-
tice charges." One spokesman hit on what was perhaps the real reason
for these benefits when he observed, "By virtue of organized labor's
maturity in this state, attributable in part to the act, employers are will-
ing to recognize and deal with unions." Labor personnel again voiced
diverse views. Typical were these two comments: "Employees have
benefited from the act by virtue of the fact that they have obtained
prompt service in the scheduling of representation elections, ' 47 and, "I
45Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§151-66(1952).46 Contrast Section 111.02 (8) of the WEPA defining a labor dispute as,
any controversy between an employer and the majority of his employees
in a collective bargaining unit concerning the right or process or details
of collective bargaining or the designation of representatives. Any organ-
ization with which either the employer or such majority is affiliated may
be considered a party to the labor dispute,
with Section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which defines the term labor
dispute as including
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment or con-
cerning the association or representation of persons negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to change terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
47 WIS. STAT. §111.05 (1959).
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do not know of anyone other than an [unorganized] employer who has
benefited."
In sum it would appear significant that both management and a ma-
jor segment of labor are in agreement that the act has reduced some of
the strife interest in labor-management relations. Interestingly enough,
both the answers elicited in response to the questionnaire and the an-
swers volunteered in confidence agreed on this point. Both parties ex-
pressed general interest in knowing the rights and obligations accruing
to their organizations under the WEPA and both expressed a very real
desire to avoid administrative and judicial review of their conduct.
B. SHOULD THE ACT BE REPEALED?
Question 14 of the questionnaire asked:
Should the Act be repealed? If not, should it be modified? If
the latter, what amendments do you feel are necessary, in order
of importance ?49
Over eighty per cent of those interviewed favored either a retention of
the Peace Act or at least some form of state regulation of labor-manage-
ment relations. Even those at odds with the philosophy of the act sug-
gested that there is "grave danger" in leaving the regulation of labor-
management relations exclusively in the hands of the federal govern-
ment. Representatives of management, with one or two notable excep-
tions, were for the most part satisfied with the WEPA as it now exists.
Spokesmen for organized labor, particularly during the concluding
phase of the field study suggested:
Perhaps the time is up for us to again turn our attention to state
legislation.
Both labor and management attorneys were agreed that "states
should be allowed to act in those instances in which the NLRB de-
clines to act."
Labor's position may be summarized as a demand for "positive
state action to reaffirm labor's right to organize and bargain collec-
tively." Management's position, on the other hand, may be stated:
We believe that state legislation in this area offers a unique vehicle
for the settlement of industrial strife; every effort should be
made to preserve the state's right to act affirmatively in this area.
Thus it appears that both parties, faced with possible abandonment
of the field by the state,50 overwhelmingly favor the retention of some
form of state labor legislation.
48 Current statutory resolution of the "no man land" of the late fifties is to be
found in Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
49 Supra note 43.
50 For the subsequent solution to the preemption problem, see National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29, U.S.C. §§151-68 (1952).
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C. MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
Turning next to mediation, the parties expressed a belief that both
the act and the Board's efforts in this area have served the cause of
labor-management peace.
Since the Board plays a lesser role in the area of arbitration, no
single conclusion attests the feelings of the parties. Organized labor did
during the course of the field interviews suggest that the act be "re-
vised in such a manner as to preclude the adjustment of grievances
between an employer and individual employees in a collective bargain-
ing unit," particularly when such adjustments are in conflict with a
collectively bargained agreement. This situation arises most frequently
when a plant has just been organized and the grievance process is in
a developmental stage.
No concrete proposals were volunteered by spokesmen for organ-
ized labor in the interviews. However, a "tightening up of the act"
in this respect might well afford organized labor the protection to which
it feels it is entitled. Section 111.05 (1) might well be amended to con-
form with the appropriate section of the NLRA:
However, no employer shall enter into any adjustment of indi-
vidual grievances the subject of which is covered by a valid col-
lective bargaining agreement unless (a) such adjustment is con-
sistent with the terms of such agreement and (b) the affected
union has an opportunity to be present at the time such grievance
is presented and adjusted.51
The effect of this modification would assure the majority representa-
tive the same protection as is afforded by the NLRA.
D. PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In view of the fact that the prevention of unfair labor practices
implies affirmative action the author would like to step outside the
self imposed limitations of this article and comment on problems aris-
ing out of Sections 111.02(6) and 111.06 (e) and 111.06(2)(j).2
Both problems are admittedly statutory as opposed to investigatory
and adjudicative. However, both are critical and, as we shall see, are
important in different ways.
1. Determination of the Collective Bargaining Unit, Section
111.02(6).
The most important deficiency in the act itself which this study
has suggested lies in restrictions placed on the Board in the determina-
tion of the collective bargaining unit. Section 111.02(6) of the WEPA
provides:
The term "collective bargaining unit" shall mean all of the em-
ployees of one employer (employed within the state) except
that where a majority of such employees engaged in a single
51 Ibid.
5? Wis. LAWs 1939, ch. 57, Wis. STAT. ch. 111 (1953).
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craft, division, department or plant shall have voted by secret
ballot as provided in section 111.05(2) to constitute such group
a separate bargaining unit they shall be so considered....
Section 111.05 (2) in turn provides:
Whenever a question arises concerning the determination of a
collective bargaining unit as defined in section 111.02(6), it
shall be determined by secret ballot, and the board, upon request,
shall cause the ballot to be taken in such a manner as to show
separately the wishes of the employees in any craft, division,
department or plant as to the determination of the collective
bargaining unit.
In contrast with the rigid direction of the WEPA, Section 9(b) of
the NLRA provides:
The Board shall decide in each case whether . . . the unit ap-
propriate for the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or sub-division thereof. ... 53
Thus under the WEPA the Board is directed to determine that all of
the employees of the employer are the appropriate bargaining unit un-
less there is a showing that there are separate crafts or divisions within
the plant, in which case the matter shall be determined by a secret
ballot. In contrast, the NLRB under Section 9(b) may administratively
determine the appropriate collective bargaining unit, with or without
the holding of an advisory craft election.54
In practice several problems face the Board as a result of the direc-
tion of Section 111.05(2) which may be best illustrated by an example.
Representation elections are initiated under the WEPA by a petition
directed to the Board, which is followed by a hearing to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit. At the hearing an employer, confronted
by a craft union, invariably alleges that the appropriate unit is all of
his employees including clerical and maintenance employees. The em-
ployer's purpose in so doing is to secure as many votes against the
union as possible by including in the balloting employees having little
in common with the petitioning craft union.
Unless the union can support its demands for less than all of the
employees of the employer, the Board has no discretion but to order
an election based on a bargaining unit composed of all of the employees
of the employer. Should the union lose the election as a result of the
Board's determination that the appropriate bargaining unit encompasses
more than the group of workers for which the union petitioned, the
policy of the act has not been effectuated. On the other hand, should
the union win the election, it may well find itself representing employees
having little or nothing in common with the majority of its member-
ship.
53 Supra note 43, at 9(b).
54 See Globe Mach. & Stamping, 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
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In view of the Board's past experience in directing representation
elections, it would appear feasible that the act be amended in such a
manner as to afford the Board authority to determine the appropriate
collective bargaining unit. Such an amendment might well-adopt the
language of the NLRA,55 and afford the Board discretion in the hold-
ing of an advisory craft election.
2. Unfair Labor Practices Associated with the Commission of
a Crime or Misdemeanor
Organized labor has long been at odds with Section 111.06(2) (j)
dealing with unfair labor practices arising out of the commission of
a crime or misdemeanor. During the course of the field interviews
organized labor repeatedly pointed to this section and its implication
"that they [labor] engage in criminal activity." The fact that manage-
ment may be held in violation of the act under charges of similar con-
duct56 does not alter their position.
Board experience under Sections 111.06(1) (e) and (2) (j) would
seem to warrant either their repeal or a revision of these provisions to
clarify the Board's authority to act on complaints brought to its atten-
tion. A review of the Board's activities indicates a justifiable reluctance
to find a party guilty of a violation in the absence of a clear showing
of physical violence. It would appear that barring repeal, the most
acceptable solution to this problem' would be a revision of both sub-
sections to make it an unfair labor practice to commit a crime or mis-
demeanor in connection with any labor dispute, provided that the Board
shall act only upon those crimes or misdemeanors which have been
established by a court of competent jurisdiction.
SUMMARY
This article has attempted to survey some of the less controversial
aspects of the act against the backdrop of what its proponents intended.
To the extent that this survey may be summarized three observations
come to the fore. First, legislation alone does not produce labor-man-
agement peace regardless of the level at which it is imposed. Thus,
proponents of state labor legislation as a panacea for industrial strife
attribute to local action a role which it is incapable of fulfilling.
Second, labor-management relations may be likened to a stream
wherein seasonal "highs and lows" may be recorded while at the same
time undercurrents often remain obscured. Thus, periodic soundings
of the effect of legislation are advisable, for there is evidence that the
impact of state labor legislation diminishes directly in proportion to
the passage of time since its enactment. Presence of "legislation on the
book" is no assurance of conformity of conduct with statutory standards.
55 Supra note 43, at 9(b).
56 See Smith, supra note 7, at 255.
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Third, labor and management are today, even in a semi-industrial-
ized environment, sophisticated partners in the industrial community.
Hence the challenge facing labor legislation is in advancing a relation-
ship as opposed to keeping the "industrial peace." This would seem to
suggest the need for periodic revision of labor legislation, particularly
at state levels where change is politically possible and adjustment may








1. What was the need for the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act to begin with,
and what was it designed to accomplish?
a. What was wrong with the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act?
b. Why did Wisconsin act in 1939, while Congress did not until 1947?
2. Do you think that the Act has helped, retarded, or had no effect on labor
management relations, bearing in mind the three major interests mentioned
by the Act?
a. the public, (b) the employee, and (c) the employer?
b. Is he more secure? How?
c. How has he benefited?
3. The Wisconsin Employment Peace Act is stricter on the whole in regulating
union activities than the Taft-Hartley Act, yet the latter was enacted by an
Republican Congress which apparently could have passed a far stricter piece
of legislation than the W.E.P.A. Why was the W.E.P.A. more drastic?
4. What does organized labor, or particular segments, think of the Act? What
does management, or particular segments, think of the Act?
a. The representation provisions?
b. The unfair labor practices provisions?
c. The union security provisions?
d. The administration of the Act by the Board and courts?
5. In March of 1939, Joseph A. Padway, spokesman for organized labor, stated,
"It's one thing to pass a law and it's another to have it obeyed !" Do you feel
that either labor or management or both together have effectively subverted
the Act, boycotted the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, etc.?
6. From your experience, do you feel that the administration of the Act has
effectuated the policy set forth in the statute?
7. Do you feel that additional sanctions, civil or criminal, would strengthen the
Act and its administration?
8. Do you feel that the Act is realistic in limiting a labor dispute to a controversy
between an employer and the majority of his employees in a collective bar-
gaining unit?
9. One of labor's strongest objections to the Act is that the Board may declare
a closed shop contract terminated if it finds a union will not accept a qualified
employee of an employer. Do you feel that this objection is valid? Why, or
why not?
10. The Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice to violate the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. Are you of the opinion that our present sys-
tem of administrative review is sound or do you feel that a violation is a
proper matter for the courts in the first instance? How important are the
Board's duties in this respect?
11. The Act provides that the commission of a crime or misdemeanor, e.g., vio-
lence, in any labor controversy is an unfair labor practice, thereby providing
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for a summary remedy rather than waiting for the process of criminal law.
Do you feel that this has advanced the public interest? Or protected em-
ployers? Or employees?
12. What is your feeling as to the desirability of the strike notice provision of
the Act, covering the production, harvesting, or initial processing of any dairy
or farm products?
13. Does the division between federal and state jurisdictions present any practical
problems to employers or unions in Wisconsin?
14. Should the Act be repealed? If not, should it be modified? If the latter, what
amendments do you feel are necessary, in the order of importance?
15. What do you think of the Board's mediation function (§111.11) ?
